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V INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM
CIAUDIA MARTIN

During the period covered by this report, the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights has issued three decisions, one on reparations in the Las
PalmerasCase, and two on the merits in the Cantos and the Five RetiredPersons
cases. A short description of these last two cases is included in this report. In
addition, this report also covers a description of the most important issues
reviewed by the Court in Advisory Opinion 17.
Finally, it is worth noting that the Court is currently in the process of
deciding whether it will take up a request for a new Advisory Opinion
submitted by Mexico. Advisory Opinion 18 raises issues related to the
working rights of immigrants residing in countries of which they are not
nationals, in particular those that hold an irregular immigration status.
The full text of the reported decisions and the information regarding
Advisory Opinion 18 can be found on the website of the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights at www.corteidh.or.cr.
L Cantos vs Argentina Case,Judgment of 28 November 2002
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights ('Commission') submitted this case against the Argentine Republic ('State') alleging violations
of the rights ofJose Maria Cantos, the owner of an important business group
in the Santiago del Estero province of Argentina, citing the rights to a fair
trial and to judicial protection contained in Articles 8 and 25 of the
American Convention on Human Rights ('American Convention') and the
right to property established in Article 21, all of them in relation to the
obligation to respect and ensure provided in Article 1(1) of that treaty.
Mr. Cantos' businesses suffered financial losses due to a Revenue
Department ('Department') search of his administrative offices and seizure
of his business documents, in March 1972, based on alleged violations of the
Stamp Act. As a result, Mr. Cantos filed multiple actions against the
Department. Subsequently, Mr. Cantos was subjected to 'systematic persecution and harassment by State agents', including incommunicado detention of
himself and his minor sons, and the commencement of multiple criminal
charges against him, all of which resulted in acquittals.
On 15 July 1982, the Government of Santiago del Estero signed an
agreement with Mr. Cantos, acknowledging its debt to the company and
establishing compensation and terms of payment. Upon the expiration of
the agreed time period for payment, Mr. Cantos filed suit against the
province and the State in the Argentine Supreme Court on 4July 1986. The
representatives of the Province and the State entered preliminary objections
arguing that the agreement was illegitimate and invalid, and that the statute
of limitations had expired on any possible cause of action that Mr. Cantos
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may have had. On 4 December 1986, the Supreme Court joined the
objections to the merits stating that it was necessary to determine whether
the agreement was valid before applying the appropriate statute of
limitations.
On 3 September 1996, the Supreme Court rejected the case, holding that
the statute of limitations barred litigation on the agreement, and ordered
Mr. Cantos to pay costs totaling approximately USD 140,000,000.00, which
included filing fees and the fees of the attorneys and experts who
participated in the proceedings. Further, due to his failure to pay the
judicial fees, a 'general restraining order' was issued, preventing Mr. Cantos
from engaging in business.
On 7 September 2001, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
('Court') pronounced its judgment on preliminary objections posed by the
State. The State's first objection opposed the Court's competence to hear
the case, arguing that the rights at issue were those of a legal entity and thus
not protected under the Convention. The State argued that Article 1(1) of
the Convention refers to the rights of 'persons', and that Article 1(2) states
that '[f]or the purpose of th[e] Convention, 'person' means every human
being'. The Court rejected this argument based on the premise that, under
specific circumstances, the human rights protections of the Convention
extend to persons whose rights are 'encompassed in a legal figure or fiction
created by the same system of law', such as the case of a corporation.
The State further argued that the Court did not have jurisdiction to hear
this case because it did not have competence rationae temporis. The State
supported this position with the argument that upon its ratification of the
American Convention on 5 September 1984, it recognised that the Court's
jurisdiction 'would only take effect with regard to acts that occurred after the
ratification of the said instrument'. The Court held that it only had
jurisdiction over all events that took place after the State's ratification of the
American Convention; therefore, it decided that it would only consider the
violations to this treaty that might have arisen out of the litigation of the case
before the Supreme Court.
With regard to allegation of violation of Article 8 (right to a fair trial) of
the Convention, the Commission argued that the procedures followed by
the Supreme Court were in violation of the right to a hearing 'within a
reasonable time'. The Commission supported this argument, asserting that
although the case was complex and the Supreme Court requested the
gathering of a large body of evidence, it finally decided the case on a
procedural issue that was the basis of a preliminary objection submitted
in September 1986. In its decision in September 1996, the Supreme Court
held that the matter was time barred without taking into account that
evidence and in complete disregard for the principle of 'procedural
economy'. With respect to the procedural activity of the plaintiff, the
Commission argued that, with the exception of a postponement that
occurred as a result of an attempt by Mr. Cantos to settle the case out-ofNetherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, Vol. 21/3 (2003)
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court, he worked 'strenuously and relentlessly' on his legal suit. Finally, the
Commission alleged that the judicial authorities delayed the proceedings on
several occasions either by suspending proceedings or by taking excessive
time to make decisions on procedural aspects of the case.
The Commission further argued that while Mr. Cantos petitioned the
Supreme Court for permission to litigate without the advance payment of
filing fees, his requests were denied five times. The Commission argued that
Mr. Cantos' petitions should have been granted, as they are guaranteed
under Article 8 of the Convention. The fact that Mr. Cantos was made to pay
the expenses of the 'needless prosecution and proceedings', the Commission argued, was a violation of the right to recourse in a court of law under
Article 25 of the Convention.
The Commission also argued that the State violated Mr. Cantos' due
process rights recognised in Articles 8 and 25 of the Convention, by
'den [ying] the legal efficacy of the agreement that the defacto Governor had
signed with Mr. Cantos'. The Commission alleged that the Supreme Court's
failure to arrive at the objective truth was due to its failure to attend to
relevant arguments and evidence.
Last, the Commission requested that the Court hold that the State had
violated Articles XVIII (right to a fair trial) and XXIV (right of petition) of
the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man ('American
Declaration').
The State attempted to rebut these arguments, in turn arguing that there
was no violation of the reasonable time principle despite the fact that the
proceedings spanned the course of ten years. The State argued that in an
'ordinary civil action' proceeding, such as the proceeding brought by Mr.
Cantos, it is the duty of the plaintiff to move the case forward. The State
asserted that the time required to decide a case as complex as the one under
analysis is five years. However, given the fact that Mr. Cantos failed to move
the case along for a total of an additional five years, the final decision was
only reached ten years after the petition was initially submitted to the
Supreme Court. In regard to the complexity of the case, the State contended
that while the Supreme Court's decision was ultimately that the case was
time-barred, it was necessary for this Court to examine the evidence
surrounding the legitimacy of the agreement to decide that matter. Once
the Supreme Court decided that the agreement was invalid, it then applied
the applicable statute of limitations to the facts. The State further argued
that the Supreme Court issued timely responses to all of Mr. Cantos'
petitions, 'no matter how out of order or dilatory they may have been'.
With respect to the issue of the imposition of the payment ofjudicial fees
by Mr. Cantos, the State asserted that under Argentine law 'the filing fee
shall be the costs of trial and shall ultimately be paid by the parties, at rates
that the law shall dictate'. The State asserted that the denial of Mr. Cantos'
applications for a waiver of filing fees did not in any way impede his access to
the courts, since his failure to pay the fees did not affect the delivery of an
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opinion by the Supreme Court. In the same vein, Argentine law provides
that professional fees are to be percentages of the amount of relief claimed.
Therefore, the amount set by the Supreme Court was based on the large
amount of relief that the petitioner was claiming.
Finally, regarding the Commission's arguments under the American
Declaration, the State asserted that the Court did not have competence
ratione materiae to apply such an international instrument in a contentious
case.
The Court first referred to the application of the American Declaration to
this case. In that respect, it stated that since the alleged violations of the
Declaration referred to acts that took place before the State accepted the
contentious jurisdiction of the Court, it did not have to rule on such
allegations. Instead, the Court decided that it would only apply the
American Convention.
After highlighting that Articles 8(1) and 25 of the American Convention
protect the right of access to a court, the Court held that the court fees and
consequential late fees imposed on the victim in this case were unreasonable
and therefore a violation of those provisions. To support this holding, the
Court asserted that while the right to access to the courts is not absolute, the
limitations imposed must be proportional to the aims sought. In this case,
the Court found that there was no proportionality between the fees and the
aims sought by Argentine law. Further, the Court held that the right to
access to the courts is not satisfied by the mere fact that a final ruling is
pronounced by a court. The risk of being forced to pay excessive sums
compounds the impediment to access to the courts. The Court applied the
same reasoning in finding that the way in which professional fees were
calculated imposed a disproportionate burden on Mr. Cantos.
Dealing with the issue of the right to obtain a decision from the courts
within a reasonable time, the Court held that considering the 'complexity of
the case and the plaintiffs failure to take action to move the case forward,
the overall duration of the litigious proceedings would not be significant
enough for a finding that the articles that protect access to the courts and
judicial guarantees have been violated'.
The Court further found that the judgment of the Supreme Court of
Argentina did not perseviolate the Convention. The Court reasoned that this
would be the case, only if the judgment was arbitrary. The Court found that
thejudgment was based on an application of the law of nullity and validity of
legal acts and thus not arbitrary.
In relation to the violations found by the Court, it relied on Article 63(1)
to determine that the State was obligated to pay reparations to Mr. Cantos
and end the consequences of the violations.
In applying this provision, the Court ordered the State to: (1) forgive the
filing fee and any related fines; (2) set a reasonable honoraria for the lawyers
that participated in the domestic proceedings; (3) pay the fees and costs of
Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, Vol. 21/3 (2003)
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all experts and attorneys of the State and the Province; and (4) lift all
attachments, encumbrances, and other measures previously imposed to
guarantee payments by Mr. Cantos. The Court did not order 'moral
reparations' for the suffering of Mr. Cantos and his family, contending that
the Court's judgment in his favor represents, in itself, a type of satisfaction
and therefore such moral reparation.
I. 'Five Retired Persons' (Cinco Pensionistas) Case vs Peru, Judgment of
28 February 2003
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights submitted this case
against Peru ('State') alleging violations of the rights of five retired
individuals to property (Article 21), judicial protection (Article 25), and
progressive development (Article 26) under the American Convention, all
in relation to the general obligations to respect and ensure (Article 1(1))
and to adopt all necessary domestic measures (Article 2) to guarantee the
rights protected in that treaty. Petitioners also argued a violation of the right
to a fair trial (Article 8) under the American Convention.
The victims in this case, Carlos Torres Benvenuto, Javier Mujica RuizHuidobro, Guillermo Alvarez Hernindez, Reymert Bartra Vasquez and
Maximiliano Gamarra Ferreyra, worked in the Superintendencia de Banca y
Seguros ('SBS'), an autonomous agency of the State in charge of supervising
the functioning of banks and insurance companies, for more than 20 years
and retired between 1975 and 1990.
In 1981, the organic law of SBS amended the applicable rules that
regulated labour relations in this agency. Until then, workers' rights at SBS
were regulated by the rules applicable to public employees; in the future,
however, labour relations were to be regulated by the rules applicable to
workers in the private sector. This amendment included an exception for a
group of workers whose retirement plans were regulated under Decree
20.530, who will be allowed to remain under the public employee
regulations or to move on to the new system. The petitioners in this case
decided to continue with the old system and therefore remained subject to
the application of Decree 20.530 in relation to their pension rights. Decree
20.530 gave retired workers the right to a pension in an amount that would
be adjusted according to the salary increases received by those employees
occupying the same or analogous positions occupied by the retirees at SBS at
the time they decided to retire.
Until April and September 1992, the victims in this case received pension
payments that were in agreement with the rules provided in Decree 20.530.
Afterwards, however, the amount of their pensions was reduced 78 per cent
without prior notice or other legal notification. In October 1992, the State
adopted Decree-Law 25.792, in which Article 5 provided that retired workers
from SBS that had previously benefited from Decree Law 20.530 would be in
the future paid by the Ministry of Economy and Finances and that their
540
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pension amounts would be fixed in accordance with the salary received by
the employees of such agency. The application of Decree Law 25.792 to the
victims in this case provided legal justification for the reduction of the
amount of their pensions.
Petitioners filed multiple amparo actions against SBS, which were granted
by the Peruvian courts. Though those courts ordered SBS to reinstate the
payment of the amount that they had received until 1992, this institution
failed to comply with the orders. On January 2002, the Peruvian Congress
passed a law that derogated Article 5 of Decree-Law 25.792. Afterwards, SBS
issued resolutions recognising the right of the five victims in this case to have
the amount of their pensions set according to the rules of Decree Law
20.530. In addition, it reintegrated the sums of money that they had not
received from 1992 until 2002, without the payment of interest. Though the
five petitioners in this case have been paid their pensions accordingly since
then, SBS has cautioned them that its decision was subject to the outcome of
the Court's final ruling in this matter.
The Commission and the petitioners argued that the reduction of the
pensions without any prior notice was a violation of the right to property as
provided by Article 21 of the American Convention. In addition, as
established in Article 29(b) of the American Convention, the scope of the
right to property must be determined in accordance with the provisions of
the Peruvian Constitution and the interpretation of domestic courts, which
have stated that pension rights are recognised property rights that cannot be
altered by subsequent amendments to the social security laws. Moreover, the
Commission and the petitioners alleged that the reduction of the victims'
pensions was not based on public utility or the social interest as requested by
Article 21, that the measure was adopted in violation of the right to a fair
trial and that it was unreasonable.
The State argued that there is no violation of the right to property
because this right can be limited on the basis of the social interest. The
pensions of the five petitioners were reduced in accordance with the
appropriation law of 1991, postponed until 1992, which was declared
constitutional by the Peruvian Constitutional Tribunal. Therefore, the
application of Article 5 of Decree Law 25.792 had no effect on the reduction
of the amounts of their pensions. The only action that was based on that
decree law was the transfer of payments from SBS to the Ministry of
Economy and Finance, a decision that was legally permissible because the
public administration has the power to establish the agency that would be in
charge of paying the pensions of the retirees. Furthermore, that decision
was based on the fact that SBS had adopted the scheme of the private sector
to regulate its labour relations and the five petitioners in this case had
decided to remain in the old scheme that was only applicable to public
employees.
The Court ruled that the issues at stake with respect to the right to
property in this case were: 1) whether pensions can be considered a
Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, Vol. 21/3 (2003)
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recognised property right and the legal meaning of such statement; and
2) whether there are parameters the State had to follow to determine the
amount of the petitioners' pension and, in such case, whether or not those
pension rights could be the subject of permissible limitations.
With respect to the first issue, the Court stated that both the Peruvian
Constitution and the Peruvian Courts interpreting the provisions of that
Constitution had concluded that pension rights are recognised property
rights of which petitioners cannot be deprived because they are considered
as forming part of their assets. Therefore, and in application of Article 29(b)
of the American Convention, which provides that '[n]o provision of this
Convention shall be interpreted as (...) restricting the enjoyment or exercise
of any right or freedom recognized by virtue of the laws of any State Party or
by virtue of another convention to which one of the said states is a party', the
Court ruled that Article 21 of that treaty in this case had to be interpreted
according to the scope of the Peruvian domestic law. On those bases, it
concluded that petitioners' pension rights were in fact recognised property
rights, which encompassed the right to have the amount of those pensions
to be adjusted according to the salary increases received by current
employees occupying the same or analogous positions occupied by the
retirees at the time they retired.
In relation to the second issue, the Court stated that though there was a
certain ambiguity as to the legal parameters to be followed to adjust the
pensions of the former SBS employees, the State followed for years a
practice of adjusting those pensions according to the salary increases
received by current employees of SBS occupying similar positions to those
occupied previously by the petitioners. This practice was also confirmed in
different decisions adopted by the Peruvian Courts in the claims filed by
those petitioners.
Furthermore, the Court recognised that the right to property can be
subject to permissible limitations under Article 21 of the American
Convention. In that respect, pension rights, as property rights, can also be
subject to those limitations; therefore, under certain circumstances, States
may justify the need to reduce the amount of pensions or subject them to
other changes. However, those limitations can only be applied when they are
prescribed by law, are implemented in compliance with that law, and further
one of the aims provided for in Article 21 of the American Convention, that
is to say public utility or the social interest. From the facts of this case, the
Court concluded that the Peruvian State failed to comply with those
requirements and therefore the reduction of the petitioners' pensions was
arbitrary. In addition, the State failed to comply with the decisions of the
Peruvian tribunals.
Even though the State remedied the situation of the petitioners and
recognised their right to receive pension amounts equivalent to the salary
received by current SBS employees, the Court still found a violation of the
right to property under Article 21 of the American Convention. In addition,
542
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it ruled that the decision of SBS to condition payment of the pensions on the
outcome of the final ruling of the Court should have no effect for the future
given the conclusions reached by the Court in this case.
The Commission and the petitioners also argued a violation of the right
to an effective remedy as guaranteed by Article 25 of the American
Convention. They alleged that the State failed to comply with the decisions
issued by the Peruvian courts and therefore it violated its obligation to
ensure that remedies granted to the victims be enforced, as requested by the
abovementioned provision. In addition, though the State finally began to
comply with those decisions in 2002, it conditioned its compliance on the
outcome of the final ruling of the Court. Thus, according to the
Commission and the petitioners, there has not been yet full compliance
with the orders issued by Peruvian courts.
The State rejected those arguments, alleging that orders issued by the
Peruvian courts against SBS were in fact complied with by that institution. In
fact, after the adoption of those orders, SBS paid petitioners the claimed
amount of their pensions until Decree Law 25.792 was passed. That decree
established that petitioners' pensions would be paid in the future by the
Minister of Economy and Finance and that the amount of those pensions
would be set in accordance with the salaries received by the employees of
that agency. Petitioners, argued the State, failed to challenge that decree
and to bring suit against the Minister of Economy and Finance. In
consequence, since they failed to exhaust domestic remedies, they cannot
claim that the Peruvian State has not complied in full with the decisions of
the domestic courts. Thus, there is no violation of the right to an effective
remedy.
To determine whether or not there was a violation of Article 25 of the
American Convention, the Court analysed the facts argued according to
three different periods of time. First, the Court reviewed the facts that
transpired since petitioners' pensions were reduced until April-October
1992. In that period, as a consequence of the decisions issued by Peruvian
courts, SBS proceeded to pay petitioners the same amount they had received
before the reduction took place. SBS paid petitioners' pensions until the
adoption of Decree Law 25.792 which transferred such payment to the
Minister of Economy and Finance. During that period the Court found that
the State had in fact enforced the decisions of domestic courts and that no
violation of Article 25 had taken place.
Next, the Court analysed the facts that occurred between the adoption of
Decree Law 25.792 and the derogation of Article 5 of that decree, which
applied to the petitioners in this case, inJanuary 2002. The Court concluded
during that period that the State failed to enforce the decisions of the
domestic courts. The argument that the petitioners did not challenge the
decree or bring suit against the Ministry of Economy and Finance was
rejected because domestic courts did in fact order both the SBS and the
Ministry of Economy and Finance to comply with their decisions. Therefore,
Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, Vol. 21/3 (2003)

543

Human Rights News

the Court found that there was a violation of Article 25 during this period of
time.
Finally, the Court reviewed the period of time that started with the
derogation of Article 5 of Decree Law 25.792 and the subsequent resolutions
of SBS establishing the reinstatement of the payment of petitioners'
pensions according to the claimed amounts and continued until the
decision of the Court. During this period, the State complied with the
decisions of the domestic courts and therefore the Court found no violation
of Article 25 of the American Convention.
The Commission and petitioners also alleged a violation of Article 26 of
the American Convention which essentially provides for an obligation to
adopt measures with a view to achieving progressively the full realisation of
the economic, social and cultural rights set forth in the Charter of the
Organization of American States. They argued that this obligation implies
that States must move progressively toward the full realisation of economic,
social and cultural rights, including the right to social security. Any
regressive measure that affects those rights, unless it is absolutely necessary,
reasonable and justified on the basis of the interest of society, violates the
progressive obligation set forth in Article 26. The reduction of petitioners'
pensions was a regressive measure which was not justified by the State
though it affected petitioners' right to social security. Thus, the Commission
and petitioners argued that there was a violation of Article 26.
The State rejected this argument alleging that petitioners' right has not
been affected and that no regressive measure has been implemented
because they are currently receiving pensions that are equivalent to the
salaries paid to current employees of SBS. Moreover, the obligation of
Article 26 cannot be interpreted in a way that prevents States from
establishing permissible limitations to pension rights.
The Court concluded that the duty of progressive development provided
for in Article 26 of the American Convention must be analysed in the
context of the access to economic, social, and cultural rights, including the
right to social security, by the general population and not in light of the
particular situation of a small group of individuals as is the case in this
complaint. Therefore, the Court rejected the request to rule on the
progressive development of economic, social and cultural rights in Peru, in
the framework of this case.
Finally, petitioners but not the Commission alleged a violation of the
right to a fair trial, in particular the right to a competent, independent and
impartial tribunal as protected by Article 8(1) of the American Convention.
They argued that their cases were transferred to provisional judges as part of
the reorganisation of the judiciary that took place in 1994 and taken out of
the jurisdiction of the established courts. These provisional judges were
highly dependent on the Executive branch and therefore lack the necessary
impartiality and independence to satisfy the standards of fair trial
guaranteed in that provision. The Commission, on the other hand, alleged
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that petitioners could raise this new allegation before the Court because it
was based on the same facts submitted by the Commission in its petition. In
addition, the Court could also consider the application of this provision
even it had not been raised by the parties to this case on the basis of the iura
novit curia principle.
The Court held that it is impermissible for the parties to raise new facts
beyond those included in the initial petition presented to this tribunal, with
the exception of those subsequent facts that took place after such petition
was submitted. With respect to the law, however, petitioners have the power
to argue the violation of additional rights to those alleged by the
Commission in its petition, as long as the petitioner's arguments are based
on the same set of facts submitted to the Court. This holding is based on the
fact that individuals are the ones entitled to claim all the rights enshrined in
the American Convention; a different interpretation would only establish an
undue restriction to their condition of subjects of international law.
Notwithstanding this statement, the Court held that it was not necessary
to decide on the alleged violation of Article 8 of the American Convention.
The Court ultimately found additional violations of the general obligations to respect and ensure provided in Article 1(1) and to adopt all the
necessary measures to ensure the protection of the rights contained in the
American Convention guaranteed in Article 2 of that treaty.
Lastly, the Court ruled under Article 63(1) that the State had to make
reparations for the violations of the rights protected under Articles 21, 25,
1(1) and 2 of the American Convention. In that respect, it held that though
its ruling constituted in itself a type of reparation, the State still had to
compensate to the non-material damage suffered by the petitioners in this
case; thus, it ordered the State to pay, within a one-year period, USD 3,000
each as reparation for such damages. Also, the Court ordered the State to
pay, within six months, USD 13,000 for expenses and USD 3,500 for costs
incurred in the proceedings. Furthermore, the Court held that any
monetary consequences that could arise out of the violation of the right
to property of the petitioners should be decided according to domestic law
and by domestic courts. Finally, the Court ordered the State to proceed to
investigate and sanction those responsible for not enforcing the decisions
adopted by the Peruvian Courts.
IH. Advisory Opinion No. 17, Legal Status and Human Rights of the Child,
adopted on 28 August 2002
On 30 March 2001, under Article 64(1) of the American Convention on
Human Rights, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
requested the Inter-American Court of Human Rights to issue an Advisory
Opinion interpreting whether Articles 8 and 25 of that Convention impose
limitations to the discretion of States to adopt special measures of protection
for children, as provided in Article 19 of that treaty. In addition, it requested
Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, Vol. 21/3 (2003)
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that the Court express general and valid criteria on this matter in conformity
with the framework of the American Convention.
The Commission made its request on the basis of certain interpretative
principles applied by some States when adopting special measures for
children that may weaken their right to a fair trial. These interpretative
principles include: (1) minors are unable to fully understand their actions
and thus their participation, personally or through a representative, is
reduced in civil and criminal proceedings; (2) decision-makers assume that
minors are unable to understand their actions fully and attach less
importance to procedural guarantees when deciding the 'best interests of
the child'; (3) the child's family situation becomes a central factor in
deciding the child's responsibility when placed in administrative or criminal
proceedings; and (4) the child's situation may be used to justify measures
usually reserved for criminal punishment.
The Commission also requested that certain specific measures be
analysed for their compatibility with Articles 8 and 25 of the Convention,
including: (1) decisions, absent due process, to remove children from their
families based on the family's financial inability to provide for education or
maintenance; (2) deprivation of the liberty of children based upon a
determination that they have been abandoned or are prone to fall into
situations of risk or illegality; (3) the acceptance of criminal confessions
from minors without due process; (4) lack of representation of minors in
judicial or administrative proceedings; and (5) determination of the rights
and liberties of minors without the right to be heard personally.
The Commission initially requested that the Court interpret certain
provisions of the American Convention, but later it expanded its request to
include the interpretation of other treaties, in particular the Convention on
the Rights of the Child, alleging that these treaties could contribute to
establish the scope of the provisions of the American Convention. The
Court held that under its advisory jurisdiction it can interpret any human
rights treaty in which a member State of the Inter-American System is a
Party; therefore, considering that the Convention on the Rights of the Child
has been ratified by almost all the members States of the Organization of
American States, the Court asserted its jurisdiction to deal with the issues
submitted by the Commission. In addition, the Court suggested that it would
also take into consideration a broader international corpus iuris regarding
the rights of the child in interpreting Article 19 of the American
Convention.
Ultimately, the Court concluded that there were no other procedural
considerations to reject the request and assertedjurisdiction to proceed with
the advisory opinion submitted by the Commission.
With respect to the structure of its opinion, the Court decided first to
analys certain substantial concepts that would provide the appropriate
framework and then to consider the procedural matters submitted for its
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consideration in the Commission's request. In that context, it analysed the
following issues:
A. Definition of Child
To fulfill the aims of the Advisory Opinion, the Court enunciated
parameters for the term 'child', as used, but yet undefined, in Article 19
of the American Convention. Relying on the Convention of the Rights of the
Child ('CRC'), the Beijing Rules, the Tokyo Rules, the Riyadh Guidelines,
and its own case law for guidance, the Court chose to include all those under
the age of 18 in the definition of child. In addition, it concluded that those
considered children are subjects entitled to rights, not only objects of
protection.
B. Equality
The Court further found it necessary to define the meaning and scope of the
'principle of equality' with respect to children. In that regard, it stated that
not all differences in treatment were per se discrimination, nor were they per
se violations of the Convention. Thus, differentiated treatment granted to
minors on the basis of their special conditions cannot be considered
discriminatory, but rather a measure to better ensure the full exercise of the
rights recognised for children. To support its conclusion, the Court cited
one of its previous holdings, reasoning that 'there would be no discrimination (...) when the classifications selected are based on substantial factual
differences and there exists a reasonable relationship of proportionality
between these differences and the aims of the legal rule'.
C. Best Interests of the Child
The Court emphasised throughout the Advisory Opinion that decisions
affecting children should be made with reference to the 'best interests of the
child'. To ensure that this fundamental principle is observed, both Article 3
of the CRC and Article 19 of the American Convention require that States
provide 'special care' and adopt 'special measures of protection' for
children. In the end, the Court concluded that 'best interest of the child (...)
entails that children's development and full enjoyment of their rights must
be considered the guiding principles to establish and apply provisions
pertaining to all aspects of children's lives'.
D. Duties of the Families, Society, and the State
The Court first asserted that the adoption of special measures of protection
for children is a responsibility of the State, the family, the community and
the society to which the children belong. In addition, it stated that the State
Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, Vol. 21/3 (2003)
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should strive for the protection of minors by strengthening the unity of
family, as the Court finds it to generally be the best means to ensure the
rights of children. The family unit, it was held, is expected to provide the
greatest protection against 'abuse, abandonment and exploitation'. With
respect to the scope of the concept of family, the Court stated that it should
be understood in a broad sense as including all those linked by close
kinship.
The Court further asserted that children have the right to live with their
family. Separation from family should only occur if there are justified
reasons based on the best interest of the child to adopt such a measure. Lack
of material resources of the family, for example, cannot be the only reason
to support an administrative orjudicial decision for separating a child from
his or her family. In sum, children should remain with their families unless
there are exceptional circumstances, and if so, separation should be
temporary.
Next, the Court stated that to fulfill its obligations to protect children
and their families, the State must put in place institutions that are properly
qualified and have adequate staff, suitable means, and proven experience in
such tasks.
Fourth, the Court held that in relation to children, the right to life
provided in Article 4 of the American Convention includes an affirmative
duty for States to adopt all necessary measures to ensure that minors' lives
develop under 'decent conditions'. In addition, States must also make all
possible efforts to ensure the protection of children's economic, social and
cultural rights. Among them, the right to education stands out as one of the
most crucial obligations that States must comply with in respect to children
because full exercise of this right 'contributes to the possibility of enjoying a
dignified life and to prevent unfavorable situations for the minor and for
society itself. In conclusion, the Court referred to education, along with
health care, as the 'key pillars' to ensure the enjoyment of a decent life by
children.
Finally, according to Articles 19, 17 and 1(1) of the American Convention, States have positive obligations to adopt all the necessary measures to
protect the rights of children. In particular, States must protect children
from mistreatment by any source, including public authorities, individuals,
or government entities. Moreover, in addition to civil and political rights,
States have a positive duty to ensure children's economic, social and cultural
rights. Lastly, States must recognise the crucial role of family for the wellbeing of children by providing special measures to strengthen family unity.
E. judicial or Administrative Proceedings Involving Children
In relation to the procedural issues raised by the Commission in regard to
the judicial or administrative proceedings involving children, the Court
stated the following considerations:
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1. The Court stressed the 'immaturity and vulnerability' of children, stating
that they require protection to exercise their rights. As to judicial and
administrative proceedings, the Court recognised that children interact
within these processes differently than adults, legitimising differences in
treatment corresponding to the different situations of the participants.
Further, the Court concluded that while due process rights apply to all
persons, those same rights require additional measures in order to be
enjoyed by children.
2. The Court took notice of the fact that within the group 'children' there is
great diversity in physical development and mental cognisance affecting the
amount of personal participation that the child should have in proceedings.
While these differences justify differing amounts of participation by
children at different developmental stages, the Court asserts that the
benchmark must be that there has to be 'as much access as possible by the
minor to examination of his or her own case'.
3. In dealing with criminal culpability of children, the Court assessed
general principles of criminal law in order to analyse the way in which the
concept of children fits within these principles. The Court stated that
chargeability, a person's capacity for culpability, is necessary in order to file
charges against a person. It follows that since children below a certain age
are generally considered to lack capacity, those children should not be
criminally charged.
4. In addition, the prosecution of criminal actions committed by children
requires that specialisedjurisdictional bodies be put in place in order to take
the special needs of children into account. The most fundamental principle
when dealing judicially with children, in a criminal context, is that juvenile
crimes should be limited to only those actions which are defined as crimes.
Issues of poverty, disease, abandonment, family, school, and social adaptation problems, and other such issues should not be treated as crimes in the
case of children, as they are not treated as such with regard to adults. Also,
the Court clearly mandated that children should be heard in judicial bodies
distinct from those in which adult criminal matters are heard.
Meanwhile, the Court accepted the fact that there are some situations in
which it is necessary and in the best interests of the child that he or she be
placed in the care of institutions with qualified staffs. Such situations
include: children exposed to great risk or harm due to deviant behaviour,
health problems, poor family environment, or insufficient education. In
such situations, the Court respects the rights and responsibilities of parents
with regard to their children and asserts that these may not be altered
arbitrarily. Any such decision should be adopted in agreement with the
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existing law, be reasonable, respect the best interest of the child and be
subject to challenge to verify its suitability and legitimacy.
5. Additionally, the Court discussed the fact that the right to a fair trial,
mandatory whenever personal liberty is at issue, is equally fundamental in
the case of children. The Court clarified the extent of the rules of due
process and the right to a fair trial by stating that these rules must apply in all
proceedings conducted by the State or under its supervision, judicial or
otherwise. Among the due process guarantees that must be respected in the
case of proceedings in which children are involved are the right to a
competent, independent and impartial court, the right to appeal and the
right to an effective remedy.
The Court noted that due process concerns arise most commonly with
children in the context of statements made by them. In these situations, the
Court laid out necessary procedural safeguards, such as the possibility of
remaining silent, the assistance of counsel, and the statement being made
before the legal authority empowered to receive it. In evaluating statements
of children, the Court highlighted the importance of underscoring the age
and experience of the child, taking into account the fact that at certain ages,
children may not be able to understand what they are saying. While this
would apply to testimony generally, the Court cautions that this would not
be an issue should the child be the accused in a criminal matter because
children are excluded from participating as the accused in criminal
proceedings.
Another important due process guarantee that must be respected in
proceedings in which children are involved is the right to adversarial
proceedings. Either the child or his or her representative should participate
in all procedural acts, in particular in the collection and challenge of
evidence and the statement of arguments.
An additional consideration in the case of children is that of privacy.
While much administrative and judicial information is public, the Court
stated that when the proceedings are addressing the issues of a child, the
public nature of the proceedings should be altered. The Court did caution,
however, that this should not affect the collection of evidence and other
such matters, but be limited to external observance.
Finally, the Court recognised the importance of alternative mechanisms
to resolve controversies in which minors are involved, but stated that those
proceedings must be regulated with special consideration to ensure that the
rights of children not be diminished or in any way affected.
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